The question I am going to discuss is whether, when a person means something, for example when he says something and means it, or when he meanS this or that by what he says, or when he inadvertently says one thing although he means to say another, the meaning of it is something which goes on in him, an activity perhaps, or a process or a state or an event. If it is one of these things it will more likely than not be a mental something or other; but I do not wish to exclude the possibility that it might be something physical, such as looking stem when he makes a dire threat and means it, or perhaps an increase in the pulse rate. So while I will mostly talk about the possibility that meaning is a mental phenomenon, my remarks will generally apply equally well to the possibility that it is something physical.
"How do you mean?", the question I have given as the title of this essay, is therefore only one of the questions I shan be conSidering and even so it has to be taken in a speCial and, you may think, peculiar way: that is as meaning 'What do you do in order to mean something?" or "How do you go about meaning something?" This question presupposes that meaning is something we do; but it might also be something that happens in us, and if so we could call it an event if it happened brieRy and intermittently, a process if it took some time and was marked by internal complexities, or a state if, like health, it involved a set of things being true of us at the same time.
I desperately hope that the reader will be at least a little inclined to think that meaning something is one or other of these things, because otherwise he will likely only find these ruminations tiresome, and go away confirmed in the popular belief that philosophers are people who develop to a very fine point the art of tilting at windmills. But, not to rely entirely on chance in this matter, let me offer some considerations that might persuade One that meaning is something we do, or that happens in us.
First of all, many of the ways we express ourselves strongly suggest this. We say "I said it and I meant it" and this looks like two things, not one; and when we say HI said it without meaning it," or "I said it but didn't mean it," this looks like a report of the absence of one of these things, which would normally be present. We say 'What I meant when I said that was ... ," and this looks like a report of something that went on alongside the saying of something; we talk of "trying to say what we mean," and this looks like a report of the existence of a state of affairs called "meaning something" prior to the existence of a state of affairs called "expressing it in words." And so On.
Secondly, when we use the verb "to mean" in these ways, there does seem to be an inner state of ours that is importantly connected with our expressing ourselves the way we do. If we make a dire threat and mean it, we may be conscious of a feeling of grim determination. Or if we refer in conversation to Mr. N. and mean "the tall man over there in the com er," we perhaps think of him, or look his way. And when we are struggling to say what we mean, there is a familiar if hard-to-describe experience of the imminence of successful expression which could be called a pre-verbal knowledge of what we mean, or what we want to say.
Thirdly, it is generally either true or false that we mean a dire threat, or mean this rather than that by something we have said; and a natural, if not a necessary, answer to the question what makes it true or fal se is that it is the presence or absence in the speaker of an appropriate mental state. It is true that I mean a tllteat if I feel something like grim determination, but false if instead I merely feel amusement at the reaction of the threatened person.
While I have set out these reasons for thinking that meaning is something mental, I am inclined to think it is generally not because of sober consideration of reaSOns that we are likely to believe such things: there is ever so much more conspiring to make us believe them than can be laid out succinctly in the form of reasons. W e tend to be more convinced than a short list of reasons would ever warrant; and disposing of any given set of reasons is likely to leave us with a backlog of undiscussed worries that will generally be sufficient to keep us trapped. For this reaSOn the kind of discussion I am about to embark on could aptly be called logical therapy -by which is meant, not that people on whom the therapy is worked are treated as being sick, and their views treated as symptoms of something quite unlike the sensible and rational phenomenon they purport to be, but only that the discussion is likely to range into all kinds of miscellaneous comers of human thought, and is likely to consist more often in displaying ways of getting started On the jobs to be done, than in actually covering all the vast territory to be covered.
I am proposing to show -or show how it can be shown -that meaning something is neither a mental nor a physical phenomenon; but before getting to work on this project I had better, if only to keep everything philosophically pure, say something about how various are the uses of the verb fl to mean."
To begin with, there are uses having nothing to do with this issue, for example where certain states of affairs mean, that is to say indicate something. A red sky in the evening is said to mean fair weather tomorrow, and certain medical symptoms mean that a person has a certain disease. "Means" is also sometimes about equivalent to "rnatters ll or "is important," as in "It means a great deal to me whether he comes." Sometimes also it is about equivalent to "intend," as in "I have been meaning to write for a long time." And much the commonest of the uses we are not discussing are those connected with the asking and giving of the meanings of words.
The class of uses we are discussing can be roughly defined by two characteristics: first, a person is the subject of the verb "to mean," and second ( to exclude cases like "meaning to write") his meaning something is directly tied up with his saying something.
One might think that for the class so defined (or indicated) "mean" always meant about the same thing, but in fact there are considerable differences. When we correct a slip of the tongue or other speech ineptitude, saying "what I meant to say was ... ," we are scrubbing one utterance and replacing it with another; when we interpret something we have said, saying "what I meant by that was . .. ," we are giving an alternative rendition of what we have said; when we explain ourselves further, saying "what I mean is ... ," we are not explaining the meaning of what we have just said, but simply saying more along the same lines; when we say something and add that "we mean it," we are not further explaining what we have said, but indicating that it should be taken just as it stands; when we say that we meant something as a joke or as a compliment, we are not straightening out or clarifying what was said, but SO to speak the auspices under which it was said; and when we struggle to express ourselves and call it "trying to say what we mean," there is nothing that we are correcting, explaining, or adding to.
You might say that this does not show that "mean" has various meanings, but only that different sentences in which it appears mean different things: the word itself always means about the same. We could substitute "intend" for "mean" in all these sentences, and they would have the same meaning. And I would not deny that this substitution could be worked. But it seems to me only to obscure the differences of sensewhich lurk equally if not more in the use of the word "intend." If I say "It is hot" when I meant to say "It is humid," it is not generally true that I formed the intention of saying "It is humid," but something slipped and I said "It is hot": I just see now that ''humid'' would have been a better word. And if I explain what I meant by something I have said, it is not generally true that I had formed an intention of saying what I now offer as elucidation, but for some reaSOn instead made the remark that I am now elucidating: it is just that it nOw seems to me that I can clear the air by elucidating the remark in this way.
Yet it may not matter whether the differences I have noted are differences of meaning or of something else: in any case there are differences, and I shall have to be careful not to overlook them. There will not be a great deal I can say in general as to whether meaning is something mental (or physical), but there are some general points, and I will begin with a few of these.
If meaning is something that goes on in a person, it is probably true that it must be a process, a state, an activity, or an event, and hence if we could show that it was none of these, then in the absence of other alternatives we would have a very general reason for doubting that it was any kind of phenomenon at all.
I suggest the following as a method of deciding whether meaning is any of these things: for anyone of them, sayan activity, decide on a few things that are activities if anything is. It will not matter, I think, whether you choose mental or physical activities, but for safety's sake, choose some of each. Then using these specific examples as guides, make a little list of things which are sometimes true of activities. It will not matter how frequently these things are true; what matters is whether it sounds odd to inquire in any particular case whether this or that item on the list applies. Then, going On the principle that if anything is an activity, at least a fair number of these things which may be true of activities in general will be true of it, we can decide whether meaning is an activity by seeing how far it shares the characteristics of activities in general.
Following this prescription, we might take as our stock cases of activities, thinking, writing a letter, or playing tennis. And some of the things that are sometimes true of these are that a person can be ordered to perform them, and can decide, refuse, omit, or forget to do so. A person can be skilled or incompetent at them, can be busy doing them, be interrupted while doing them, and can find the performance of them easy or difficult, tiring, pleasurable, or boring.
If we now apply this list of things characteristic of activities in general to the case of meaning, we find that although there are senses in which we can order, or at least suggest, that a person mean this or that, they are not the ordinary sense, the sense in which a person can say "Rightl" and thereupon mean it; and we can't make a false promise by cunningly omitting to mean it, or a true promise by performing the act of meaning it as well as the act of saying it; we can't decline to explain what we meant on the ground that we simply forgot to mean anything; it is not skill at meaning things which enables us to mean one thing by another, or want of skill which prevents us from meaning false or meaningless things; it is neither pleasurable nor boring, tiring nor a cinch to mean by "Mr. N .," "the tall man over there in the corner"; we can't be busy meaning something, nor can we be interrupted by a phone call in the middle of it, and later have difficulty remembering where we left off. All of which makes it extremely hard to see how meaning could be an activity, mental or otherwise. Applying this little method to processes, we might take as our stock cases learning and physical growth. These phenomena obviously share a durational characteristic with activities, and therefore many of the same things about being pleasurable or boring, being interrupted and resuming, can be said about them, the main difference here being that where in the case of activities we would talk of dOing, omi tting, and forgetting, in the case of processes we would talk of wishing and hoping that the process would occur or resume, of noticing that it was going on, of its failing to occur or resume, and of being delighted or disappointed that it should or should not occur. Processes also are typically marked by stages and developments, and move towards some sort of completion.
But again none of this applies to our meaning things. We do not wish that we would mean by "Mr. N." "the short man with the beady eyes," or notice with surprise or with dismay that we are well on the way towards meaning "the man with the quaint sense of humour"; we would not know what to make of the question how long it took to mean something, or whether it went through more qUickly when we were in good health, nor could we suggest any typical stages or developments in the process of meaning something.
With these methods and models as a guide, you will perhaps be able to do the job yourself for the cases of states and events. There will be some of the same questions about hoping, fearing, noticing, enjoying, but also some new questions about predicting, diagnosing, establishing the exact time and frequency of occurrence, etc. For example, you might lind yourself asking how often you mean by "Napoleon" "the man who lost at Waterloo," and whether it sometimes happens "out of the blue," when you are not thinking about Napoleon, or whether it only happens when you mention him, and if so, whether it happens COncurrently with, or a little before, or even a little after your mentioning him. And so on.
I do not propose to do this job, but instead boldly to claim that meaning is not an activity, a process, a state, or an event. This seems to me to make it highly unlikely that it is a mental or physical phenomenon at all; but there just might be some other category of phenomena, and so not to rely too heavily on one little argument I will advance some other considerations to support the same conclusion.
Something pretty obviously called for is that I should go back over the arguments I suggested in the first place to the effect that meaning ;s something mental, because if what I am now contending is right, each one of those arguments must contain a mistake somewhere.
The first of them, you will remember, was the strong grammatical suggestion of two things, not one, contained in such remarks as "I said it and I meant it," or 'What I meant when I said that was .... " Has something gone wrong here? Well in the first place only some grammatical constructions carry this suggestion : we say "I said it and I meant it," but not "I said it and also meant it," and certainly not "I said it but omitted or forgot or failed to mean it"; and we say "what I meant when I said that was ... ," but not "What I meant as I said that was .... "
We don't in short express ourselves in all the ways you might expect if there were two things here; but still you might ask whether, grammar aside, it is not anyway the case that "I meant it" or "I meant such and such" reports something. I will try to show that it does not report anything by giving an alternative account of the conditions under which we say we mean something. This account will apply only to cases of "meaning what we say," and different accounts would have to be given for other uses. But from it you may at least see that we don't always have to take these expressions to be reporting something.
I am going to suggest that when we make a dire threat or an extraordinary claim and say that we mean it, our saying this is not a report of anything, but an action, which could be compared to a move in a game like chess, or to a promise: it puts us in a new position where it will be particularly embarrassing if we do not carry through on our threat or stand by our claim. There may be planning and deliberation prior to the move or the promise, but the move doesn't report the planning, nor does it report a decision, because one has moved or promised just as certainly if there is no deliberation or decision . Making a move or promISIng just are perfonning certain overt actions in certain circumstances.
An obvious objection here is to say that, although saying that we mean something does indeed have the social consequence of making it particularly embarrassing to retract, still either it is just because we have professed the existence of a certain mental state that those consequences follow, or at the very least it is because we have the mental state that we are prepared to take the action and risk the consequences.
The answer to this objection is first that the existence of a mental state has nothing whatever to do with these social consequences following. There is no imaginable reaSOn why it should be more embarrassing to default on a threat if you felt tense about it when making it than if you made it quite unemotionally. This can be seen particularly clearly if you imagine a threat followed, not by "I mean it," but by a description of this or that mental state. If you try this with various possible descriptions, you will find that if they have any consequences, they are very different from those of saying "I mean it." In one case the response would he "How interestingr' in another, uHow touching!", but in none will it be anything like "You wouldn't dare" Or 'We'll believe it when we
It is simply the way the game is played, that default is more embarrassing if you have uttered the magiC words "I mean it" than if you have not done so. It is the words, not anything they stand for, which carry the consequence.
Nor is it true that it is only because we are in a certain mental state that we are prepared to make the move and risk the consequences. We don't, or anyway I don't, first notice the mental state and then decide that in view of its existence and its properties it would be reasonable to go so far as to say that I mean it. Don't we, quite often at least, just say that we mean it? And is it not (quite often) the awareness of the new plunge we have thereby taken which stirs the emotions characteristic of meaning a dire threat, and also makes us resolve to be as good as our word? We are, I think, predisposed to think that we first mean it and then say we mean it; but in the kind of case I have just been suggesting our saying that we mean it comes first, and from this other things result. I am not saying that it is always this way. The interesting thing is that this kind of case is both possible and, when you think of it, not uncommon. And what this shows is that we are not bound to the model according to which our saying things is secondary, and must report or express or describe some state of affairs, which is the primary thing.
The second reason for thinking that meaning is something mental was that so often there are mental states which occur at the time when we say that we mean, and which are, one might therefore say, obviously what we are reporting or expressing in so saying. So if I feel defiant when I say something paradoxical and mean it, my saying that I mean it will be a ,yay of saying that I feel defiant about it.
The statement I have just made is, however, fairly obviously false. It is hard to be very clear as to what we do mean when we say that we mean it, but don't we mean something like this: that in spite of any reasons for suspecting otherwise, what we have said can be taken at its face value -it means just what it appears to mean? And isn't this why we can't mean things whose meaning is not in itself fairly clear? I can't mean it when I say that the Laidlaw Library is in love with Hart House, because I haven't yet said anything which is meanable, which can be taken at its face value. It has no face value.
In case you are un convinced by this account of what it means to say that one means it, perhaps I might add that there are so many different mental states which might accompany our saying this, that if "I mean it" were thought to report !;he existence of one of these, there would be no way of deciding which of them was being reported. When I make a dire threat I may do so in various moods: of exhilaration or steely calm or intense anxiety, etc. Which of these is reported when I say that I mean it? To this question you might be inclined to reply that we at least know that one or other of a family of such states exists, and that is what is important. We don't always need to know which One it is.
The shortest of various possible answers to this objection is that the existence of one of these states is simply not what is important. We can see this I think if we imagine a case in which a person says that he means something, but cross-examination satisfies us completely that nothing whatever happened except that he said it and said that he meant it. The absence of any member of the steely calm-intense anxiety family, if it is a family, would in itself give us no reason whatever for thinking that he didn't mean it. It is not that information about a person, but rather such things as its being entirely out of character, or there being reason to see the threat as a joke or a trick, or his taking no steps at all to follow through on it, which show whether he meant it or not.
But the really telling difficulty is that it is not, when you think of it, anywhere near true that there is generally a mental state associated with our saying that we mean something. We fasten On a few cases where it is true, and quite overlook the great mass of them where it is quite obviously false. Here are some examples: (I) "You said you bought a car. Did you mean a self-propelled vehicle for transporting people?" "Of course." "And did you think that as you said the word 'car'?" "Of cOurse not." (2) "You said it is hot. Did you mean to say that it is humid?" "Yes I did. It was careless of me." "And did you think 'It is humid' as you said 'It is hot'?" "Of course not. I just see now that 'humid' would have been the better word." (3) "Did you mean what you said just now when you said it is a nice day?" "Of course I did. I nearly always mean what I say." "And how did you do it? Did you mentally mark 'Correct' beside it as you said it, or did you feel a glow of sincerity?" "Of course not. I just said it. What do you take me for?" Such examples could be multiplied endlessly, and would show that we really hardly ever have an accompanying mental state of any interest when we mean something.
There is of course the other type of case, for example where we make terrible threats or extraordinary claims, which it is "hard" to mean, or where, having attached an unconventional meaning to an expression, we are conscious of its oddity as we use it. But I think we unbalance our diet, feeding only on these cases and coming back to them again and again. And we do this, not because they are in themselves so convincing (I think I have shown this in what I have just now been saying) but because we are convinced that there must be something which "to mean" stands for, and since these are the only examples which are even plausible, we use them to satisfy our hunger.'
Let me go on nOw to the third of the general considerations which I suggested earlier tempt us to think that meaning is something mental: the fact that it can be true or false that a person means something, and the consequent hunch that it is true if an appropriate mental state exists, and false otherwise.
Here again there is the little empirical difficulty that although there are exceptions, and we do fasten on these, still as we have just now seen, in the general run of cases where it is true that we mean something, there is nothing which will at all nicely serve as the mental state which makes it true.
We are inclined however to be undaunted by this fact because, we think, mental states are queer things, hard to pinpoint and describe. Isn't it, one wants to say, only a problem of discerning and finding words to report these elusive phenomena? We shouldn't expect that things like this will be obvious, or easy.
Here there can be two kinds of case: one where other people know whether I mean it, or whether I mean this or that, and one where I know whether I mean it or what I mean. I shall take it that there is just nO question of other people using my state of mind as their guide in such matters and hence that the only question is whether I use my state of mind as a gUide here. How do we tell in our own case whether we mean something? My Iirst point is that if the question "How do we tell?" means something like 'What procedures do we follow?" then generally we simply don't (in this sense) tell. We follow no procedures. We don't call up states of mind and check whether they are adequately expressed in sentences or paragraphs, or do anything else: we just straight-off say what we mean, or straight-off answer u yes"1 Hno", or "not quite" to the question whether we mean such and such. Well, perhaps not always straight-o(f, exactly: we often feel a momentary tension, furrow our brows or pound our forehead, and then say something. But none of these things is what it is to mean something. They tend to be the same whatever we mean. By "straight-off" I mean "without any prelude which is logically connected with what we end up saying." I myself have had SOme difficulty seeing that this is true, and I suspect that I am not alone in this regard. I will therefore devote a little time to constructing and commenting on a contrary picture which I think we are very much tempted to paint.
According to this picture there is such a thing as knowing what one wants to say, even before one finds the words in which to say it. This knowledge consists in having a pre-verbal mental content, sometimes but not generally a mental image. It can't generally be an image, because for most of the things one ever says one couldn't suggest an appropriate image; being neither pictorial nOr verbal, it COmes out as something queer, indescribable. The struggle to "say what we mean" is a struggle to encapsulate this queer thing in words: which may be thought of as a kind of code into which mental contents are translated for purposes of communication and storage. The words in themselves are as dead and meaningless as a code generally is: they acquire meaning and are understood by inducing a mental state in the minds of people who read or hear them. And they are correctly understood, and the process of communication is successful if the states of mind of the speaker and the hearer, or the writer and the reader, are more or less the same. According to this account, this is why we never quite know whether a person has understood: we only have external signs of his state of mind. If we could see into his mind we would know for sure. ' But now let us have another look at some of the parts of this picture, first the idea that "knowing what one wants to say" is having a (queer) mental content, second the theory that saying it is encapsulating this content in words, and third the belief that understanding these words is having produced in one a mental content reasonably like the one encapsulated.
What is it to know what one wants to say? In the first place, as I suggested earlier, in many cases it is entirely, and in all cases it is partly, a matter of wanting to say things of certain kinds. If we sit down to write a letter, we want it to be friendly, newsy, well-written, amusing; or if we set about making a point in a discussion we want it to be relevant, coherent, clear, true, etc. Asking ourselves whether a sentence expresses what we want to say, therefore, is to this extent not a matter of determining whether it encapsulates something, but whether it satisfies these requirements. And the requirements are not generally something we have in our minds, but rather something which, as highly developed beings, are just part of the way we function . We react, as it were instinctively, to a clumsy phrase or an irrelevant point.
But what about the extent to which we do want to say something specific before we find a way of saying it? What does this knowledge consist of? One type of case would be that in which I am very well versed in some difficult matter, and want to explain it to someone. And the hard fact here, I suggest, is not that I have something not yet expressed in my mind, but just that I have no doubt whatever that I will be able to give examples, answer questions, draw diagrams, explain further, etc. If the thing to be explained is an internal combustion engine, it may be that, to assure myself that I do understand it, I imagine pistons jigging up and down and thereby turning a crankshaft. But this image is not itself my understanding of that feature of the engine: rather it is because I understand that I am able to generate the image. And if I draw a picture on paper of pistons jigging up and down in the course of explaining the thing to the other person, it is not necessary to suppose that the picture is a copy of the image, because it is as easy or as hard to understand how I could just draw it directly as it is to understand how I could just imagine it directly. Or for that matter, how I could just directly describe it in words. I might first imagine and then describe it, but I might equally first describe and then imagine it. This is one type of case of knowing what one wants to say, and there are others, some of which I will consider a bit later. At this point, for want of a better place for it, I might mention the characteristic experience of ''having something on the tip of one's tongue." One might be inclined to offer this as the experience reported by the expression, "knowing what one wants to say." But this is surely another case of settling for any old experience which will satisfy our demand that there must be something our words stand for. That it is not the experience of knowing what one wants to say can be seen very clearly I think from the fact that when we do find the words which were on the tip of Our tongue, they are not an expression of the experience. We do that another way, namely by saying for example "Oh dear, it's just on the tip of my tongue." And if we don't find the words, then contrary to what you would expect, in spite of this experience we just don't know whether we knew what we wanted to say or not.
In view of these arguments, it may seem gratuitous to consider whether, in trying to say what we mean, we translate a mental content into words. But I might be wrong in urging that there is no mental content here, so let us suppose that there may be one, and ask whether it is by relating this to various proposed verbal formulations that we decide whether this or that is what we want to say.
To begin with a couple of obvious empirical points: first, what is suggested here is that something happens which is at least a bit like comparing a description of a woodpecker to a picture of one, to see whether the description mentions every element in the picture, and relates the elements as they are related in the picture. But nothing at all like that actually happens when we try to find the right expression. What does happen is generally that we say straight-off what we want to say (not, as I explained before, without struggle or head-clapping, but without what I called "logical" preliminaries). And in the cases where there is anything more than this going on, it is not a matter of considering whether certain words express our state of mind, but whether they are clear, coherent, nicely put, etc.
But now the interesting question is this: all kinds of things might satisfy these requirements, that is be relevant, well-formed, etc., but still not be the particular thing we were anxious to say. How do we know that although this or that would be a good point, and nicely put, and so forth, it is still not the precise point we are groping for?
Here I think we may be bewitched by a certain model of how this is done, the model namely according to which we recognize, identify, choose things by comparing them to a prototype. This is certainly an obvious way of designing a machine to do this kind of work, and it is one of the ways people do it. We give someone a picture, and tell him to bring back something just like it, or we identify real woodpeckers by their similarity to the picture in our bird book. And we may therefore be inclined to think that this is the only way, and that there must be something like this going on when we identify this or that as just the point we wanted to make.
But when you think of it, this is far from being the only way in which we recognize or identify. For one thing, we identify from descriptions, and this without first translating the description into a picture and then comparing pictures. We see straight-olf whether the object satisfies the description. And if we do sometimes entertain images as an aid in this business, we often find that we have entertained the wrong ones, and that the object satisfies the description better than the images do.
More interestingly though, we identify or recognize without any paraphernalia. I meet a friend on the street and I know him: do I compare him with an image and find that they tally, or do I remember certain propositions about him and find that they are true of this man? No, nothing whatever goes on. I just know immediately who he is.
However this can be explained, and even if it can't be explained, it is certainly the way it is. And I suggest that it is the way it is also with knowing whether this or that is what we wanted to say. We simply accept some things, and reject others. You may feel like objecting that in that case we don't after all know whether this or that is what we wanted to say. And I don't know whether to agree or not. We generally do not have any doubt, and this is part of what it is to know, but on the other hand there is not a scrap of evidence we could adduce.
Let me go on nOw to the third feature of this picture of the process of communication which I set out to discuss: the view that words produce a mental content in the person who reads or hears them, and that he understands if the content produced is the same as that in the mind of the author of the words.
I suppose the main reason we are attracted to this view is that we think the word "understand" must refer to something, something we do or that happens in us, and we can think of a lot of cases in which words do produce something in us, mostly cases of hearing or reading descriptions, when we imagine the scene or the object described. We want to say that the picture we imagine is the understancUng, and that we have understood if we have the right picture.
It is very much less easy to suggest an appropriate mental state when it is anything other than a deSCription we understand, so here again the diet may be unbalanced. But for brevity's sake let us concentrate on understanding descriptions, this being the most plausible instance.
We tend to convince ourselves that understanding is imagining what is described, by again and again thinking of a description and then imagining something. But I wonder how often we do the imagining in the ordinary course of events, when we read a desCription in a novel or a newspaper? We understand these deSCriptions, that is we are entirely confident that we could imagine or draw or recognize the scene; but how often do we actually an such imagining? If I describe to you a gracious room with tall windows looking out onto a secluded garden, you will perhaps now imagine it. But are you sure you would do this whenever you encounter such a description? And do you not understand it On those occasions when you do not imagine it?' What does the word "understand" refer to then? The answer, I believe, is that it refers to nothing whatever -not a mental state, not a disposition, not a pattern of behaviour, nor anything else. It is not upon satisfying ourselves or noticing that certain things are not true of us that we say we don't understand; but we just look distressed and say it. Do we say it because we feel distressed? It seems a bit more likely that we feel distressed because we say we don't understand, than the other way around. And we certainly don't treat a person's saying that he doesn't understand as meaning that he is distressed: for example we don't comfort him, unless we also notice signs of distress. This is all I will say about this funny picture of the process of communication, or about the more general question as to whether meaning things is a mental phenomenon. I cannot claim to have shown anything conclusively about any of these matters, but at most only to have mapped out an approach to them, and shown how that approach works for a few, and I hope not the least difficult, aspects of the issue. If, in doing so, I have brought about the disappearance of any mental rabbits, I would like to conclude by explaining, as magicians will, just how the trick is done. There are four main movements which a quick eye might have noticed me perfonning; but it is not necessary to perfonn them in any particular order or even in every case to perfonn all of them.
The first is to find a translation of sentences in which expressions like flI mean/' til meant it," Itl meant to say," etc. appear, which has the same sense as the original sentence, but which contains neither one of these expressions nOr any other which, like them, consists of a personal pronoun and a so-called mental conduct verb: neither for example "I meant to say" nor If I intended to say," "I wanted to say," HI was trying to say," etc. In any case in which this can be done, it will remove the temptation to think, on grammatical grounds, that any user of these expressions is reporting something about himself. If you think back, you will see that I have done this on several occasions. I bave suggested, for example, that sentences containing the expression "I mean" can be translated to read 'What follows is a further explanation of what has just been said"; and that sentences containing the expression "I meant to say" can be translated "It would have been better to have said," etc. M y second tactic bas been a matter of balancing the diet by assembling reminders of how very many of tbe circumstances in wbich we use tbese expressions are entirely unlike wbat we are inclined to imagine. W e dwell on a few cases wbicb seem to ( but don't) fi t the picture we want, and blithely overlook the great mass of cases which very clearly do not fit it. For example, when reflecting on what it is to say something and mean it, we dwell on cases of things wbich are difficult to mean, like dire threats and paradoxical claims, just because bere there is generally a mental state in the neighbourhood, namely the feelings of defi ance or resolution which we experience -and overlook the great majority of cases of our saying something, where it is generally also true that we mean it, but in which nothing in our consciousness can be found which will pass as w hat it is to mean it.
M y third tactic is a variant of the second, and consists of deliberately constructing cases in wbich there is no mental content, or nOne which would at all serve as being what it is to m ean, and putting it to you, as competent users of the English language, tbat you would be perfectly happy to have the verb "to mean" used in t1,ese contexts too. The reason for mentioning this as a separate device is that it can be used specifically against those cases which I suggested we fix on and feed on, the cases in which there does seem to be a plaUSible candidate for the mental state of meaning something. It is not enough to say tbat of course there are these cases, but then remember there are others: one must also come to grips with the beguiling cases themselves. One way of doing this is to describe a case of the same kind, but without the accompanying mental state, and show that a person can be said to mean it here too. The purpose of so doing is to make it clear that even where the mental state exists, it is not essential to "meaning something." This is why I described the case of a dire t1ueat in which nothing whatever happened except that the author of the threat said that be meant it; and why I urged that we would not have to deny in these circumstances that he meant it.
My fourth tactic has been to examine the explanatory models which, if we think they are the only possible explanation, contribute to persuading us of the existence of certain mental states. If we think that the only way of identifying is by comparing, then we will be much inclined to suppose that when we identify a form of words as "what we meant," we must have compared it and found it to tally somehow with a preverbal mental state of wishing to say something. I have taken two sorts of moves against such models : first that of showing that the beguiling model is not the only possible explanation of how we could do such things as recognize; and secondly that of suggesting that even if we can't explain how we do it, there most certainly are cases where at any even t we do not do it in the way the model requires -the case of recognizing a friend, for example. Now that you know just how it is done, I might expect soon to see mental rabbits disappearing everywhere because, unlike some magicians, I really have told you what I do. Unfortunately, the magician simile is not a very good one, the biggest and saddest difference being that whereas magicians' rabbits do disappear, or do appear to, these mental rabbits either defy one's control measures or else one cannot tell whether they have vanished or not, with the result that one finds oneself bravely saying "Presto'" and "Abracadabra''', and bowing to imagined applause, without ever knowing whether the trick has really come off.
And this unhappy state of affairs is I think what Wittgenstein was describing when he said that his aim in philosophy is to show the By the way out of the By-bottle.' There is a way out, and you really are indicating it when you stick a pencil in the neck or darken the bottom or tap everywhere except at the exit. But the By is curiously immune to such advice, and buzzes about the same way whatever you do. And if he ever does drift free, it will not likely be due to your having shown him how. 363, 414, 436, 593, and in Pan II, . it was farther necessary that [a man] should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions, and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind; whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds he conveyed from ODe to another." (See also ch. II, § § I, 2, 6.) For a more recent example see Jerrold J. Katz: The Philosophy of Language (Harper and Row 1966) , 103: U Roughly, and somewhat metaphorically, we can say that something of the following sort goes on when successful communication takes place. The speaker, for reasons that are linguistically irrelevant, chooses some message he wants to convey to his listeners: some thought he wants them to receive or some command he wants to give them or some question he wants to ask. This message is encoded in the form of a phonetic representation of an utterance by means of the system of linguistic rules with which the speaker is equipped. This encoding then becomes a signal to the speaker's articulatory organs, and he vocalizes an utterance of the proper phonetic shape. This is, in tum, picked up by the hearer's auditory organs. The speech sounds that stimulate these organs are then converted into a neural signal from which a phonetic representation equivalent to the one into which the speaker encoded his message is obtained. This representation is decoded into a representation of the same message that the speaker originally chose to convey by the heater's equivalent system of linguistic rules." 4 Wittgenstein: 'We fail to get away from the idea that using a sentence involves imagining something for every word .. . . It is as if one were to believe that a written order fat a cow ... had to be accompanied by an image of a cow, if the order was not to lose its meaning." (Sect. 449) 5 Philosophical Investigations, sect. 309.
